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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses recent calls for postcolonial critique and progressive politics to heed 
external, non-human imperatives. In particular, it focuses on recent work that addresses the 
demands of the Anthropocene and ‘planetarity’ to question how such approaches foreground 
epistemology critique. By revealing inner tensions and performative contradictions within 
these accounts, the paper argues for overcoming the reticence to address ontological 
difference via a turn to postconstructivist ecology. The argument extends somewhat tentative 
turns to materiality in some postcolonial theory to suggest that postcolonial epistemologies 
need, increasingly, to attend to collective ontologies of immanence, and so to ‘re-naturalise’ 
critique. Contemporary theoretical developments in human geography are progressively 
engaged with the questions and politics of material immanence and nicely placed to compose 
such re-naturalized geographies. The paper develops its claims through examples of 
indigeneity and ontologies of immanence in Amazonia. 
 
Keywords: postcolonial, postconstructivism, ontology, indigeneity, composition, critique 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
I. Introduction 
Just over a decade ago, an influential postcolonial call to provincialize knowledge 
production was felt across numerous disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. The 
appeal to decentre the implicit presence of Europe as a silent but privileged referent in 
contemporary knowledge production (Chakrabarty, 2000) was explicitly engaged by 
geographers in a special issue and antecedent to the present issue of Singapore Journal of 
Tropical Geography (Robinson, 2003; Sidaway, Bunnell & Yeoh, 2003). These interventions 
have since become formative geographical research trajectories. Robinson (2003) 
contextualized Chakrabarty’s moral imperative for urban and development geographies in an 
appeal for ‘ordinary cities’. McEwan (2003) called for re-materialised critiques of economic 
inequality and transnational exploitation. And, Sparke (2003) sought to re-energise critiques of 
the conjunction between late modern war and the proliferating enclosures of neo-liberalism. 
These trajectories and their many interlocutions since continue to produce important 
geographical responses to the destructive logics that make up our colonial and postcolonial 
present. 
But, has the call to provincialize postcolonial geographies been enough? A decade 
after the appeal to challenge Europe as the silent referent, significant questions are being 
asked of postcolonialism generally, no less postcolonial geographies. Have efforts to counter 
the Eurocentric character of knowledge production transformed scholarship in more generous 
and critical ways? Has postcolonial criticism actually succeeded in realizing a reflexive 
decolonization of knowledge production? If not, why not? What, if anything, is missing?  
These questions are pressing for two reasons. First, the postcolonial genre is under 
increasing pressure to account for its perceived waning and continued relevance. From ‘the 
end of postcolonial theory?’ (Agnani, Coronil, Desai et al., 2007), to the possibility of 
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continuing the conversation about postcolonial knowledge (Chakrabarty, 2011), to its whither 
and whence? (Stam and Shohat, 2012), to whether there is anything left in it? (Parry, 2012), 
even to sifting through its debris to ask after its remains (Quayson, 2012; Young, 2012), 
numerous questions from a variety of disciplines evidence a considerable climate of scrutiny 
for postcolonial analysis. The tenor of these queries takes several forms. The more influential 
may be distinguished between those that argue for a renewed materialist commitment to 
literature to register and render the world ‘on the basis of a transcendental critique’ (Lazarus, 
2011: 35; Parry, 2012), and those that seek to address postcolonialism’s limits through 
ecological and non-human demands (Chakrabarty, 2009; 2012; DeLoughrey and Handley, 
2011; Huggan, 2009; Plumwood, 2002; Rose, 2012; Spivak, 2003; 2006; 2011; 2012; Tsing, 
2012). While both critical approaches extend and possibly reinvigorate postcolonialism’s 
responses to the demands of ‘global contemporaneity’ (Spivak, 2012; 2), the present argument 
concentrates on the latter ‘planetary’ or ecological critiques. As such, my focus draws out a 
pressing limit to provincializing postcolonial demands, one that also exposes how materialist 
assertions that depend on renewing transcendental critique are far less radical or 
transformative than is often assumed. Doing so highlights the second reason why recent 
queries of postcolonial critique are pressing.  
Since Chakrabarty’s important call to provincialise Europe, the environment has 
increasingly dominated global socio-political concerns. Yet, while ideas of the social have 
begun to be radically rethought (ex. Latour, 2005), traditional postcolonial critiques of nations, 
identities, and territories have struggled to formulate conceptual grammars suitable to 
contemporary ecological demands. Ecology, it seems, presents both problems and alternatives 
for the postcolonial. As Chakrabarty himself notes, the Anthropocene creates ‘a real problem 
for postcolonial studies’ (2012: 12). Less a problem for postcolonial studies so much as its 
alternative, Spivak too has appealed for some time to a radical but ‘mysterious’ nonhuman 
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alterity (Spivak, 2012:341) that constitutes the ground for critical responsibility towards ‘the 
experience of an impossible planetarity’ (2012:346). One of the key challenges to postcolonial 
studies comes, then, from the need to re-think critical politics from a radical alterity co-
implicate with human intuition and agency. Such ‘new imperatives’ (Spivak, 2012: 350) require 
rethinking the limits and possibility of postcolonial and political questions: Chakrabarty appeals 
for ‘ontological and non-ontological modes of existence’ (2012:13); Spivak invokes aesthetic 
‘teleopoesis’ (2003:97). In either case, the more-than-human imperative is framed as either 
productive of inescapable ‘incommensurable scales’ (Chakrabarty, 2012: 1) or an aporetic 
‘ground’ (Spivak, 2012: 346). Both highlight an incommensurable ‘double-bind’ (Spivak 2012). 
I argue, however, that the stark choice reveals some assumed axiomatic limits 
postcolonial geographies should well begin to question. As the following will show, attempts to 
recast postcolonial conceptual grammars for the non-human through an emphasis on critical 
epistemology unwittingly reiterate Eurocentric ontologies about nature-culture distinctions. 
Indeed, Spivak’s planetary attempt to frame the re-education of epistemic habits, and 
Chakrabarty’s diagnosis of an incommensurably disjunctive politics depend on an implicit 
Eurocentric and colonialist division between nature and culture. In short, they do not 
‘provincialise’ as they should due to unrecognized ontological commitments; they are not 
nearly radical enough.  
In place of the somewhat tired rehearsals of representational limitation, I argue that 
we need to radicalise the provincialising call. Postcolonial critique is too often assumed to be 
doomed to navigate ever more nuanced epistemic protocols through reflexivity, aporia, 
agonism, and impossible alterity. Rather than never actually succeed in overcoming critical 
limits, I argue we need to recognise that that underneath postcolonialism’s commitment to 
critique is a still more fundamental euro-modernist privileging of the nature and culture 
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distinction. So, in place of a concern to re-habituate the ethical through ‘attending to the 
systematic task of epistemological engagement’ (Spivak, 2012: 9), I suggest that 
postcolonialism needs to address how addressing a more radical ground might advance 
postcolonial geographies attendant to the more-than-human. Radical grounds can be 
theorised through postconstructivist geographies of immanence.  
Postconstructivist ecological approaches (for ex. Blaser, 2010; Braun & Whatmore 
2010; Coole and Frost, 2010; Escobar 2010; Ingold, 2010), although diverse and internally 
contested, distinguish themselves from orthodox textualist postcolonialisms via a commitment 
to material immanence. Postconstructivism argues for a ‘topological sensitivity’ (Shields, 2012: 
55) to the experience of social life as a relational ontology of materials, processes, and ideas. 
Sociality, thereby, is an implicate enfolding of the totality of relations for which, in 
phenomenal analysis and focus, it becomes a complex, momentary outcome (Ingold, 2008: 
80). Thinking then is a distributed processual effect immanent in the entire system of 
environment relations within which human beings and their emergent concerns are 
necessarily entangled (Ingold, 2008: 79). Postconstructivists seek to collapse epistemology-
ontology distinctions such that the familiar tropes of transcendental critique (i.e. delineated 
conditions for possibility) give way to accounts of ‘experiment and artifice’ (Mbembe and 
Nutall, 2004: 349) and inventive composition (Lury and Wakeford, 2012). Postconstructivism 
invokes forms of thinking that do not simply reflect upon, and police, various phenomenal 
identities already constituted, as though their natures are unaffected in the act of analysis. 
Rather, it refers to the compositional effort to extract from a careful attention to the sensible, 
singular points at which the constitution of a phenomenon is decidable and can become 
otherwise. Fundamentally, immanence refers to the fact that thinking, knowledge claims, co-
constitutive responsibility, and political intervention are processes of creation rather than 
ideology critique, discovery, or prescription (de Bestegui, 2010: 6-7). 
7 
 
The following paper offers a challenging bridge between two sometimes disparate 
disciplinary discourses, postcolonial studies and their attendant critical geographies, and 
postconstructivist materialist ontologies. It does so in the effort to identify the elective 
affinities between demands placed on how the postcolonial as counter-ethic is currently being 
re-imagined, and important new materialist and post-humanist currents shaping 
contemporary geographical and political analysis. The object is not to edify one approach over 
all others, but to place two ultimately commensurate bodies of thought in productive 
conversation. After characterizing the particular arguments invoked to question the current 
limits postcolonial thinking must stretch to accommodate, the paper proceeds to describe how 
recent theoretical and empirical efforts to engage political ontologies of creation, composition, 
and experimentation (Latour 2010) can speak productively to postcolonial geographies. 
Examples are drawn from anthropologies of Amerindian ontology and perspectivism, and from 
Amazonian linguistics. The paper concludes with a brief reflection on the productive capacity 
of indigeneity as a fruitful discursive register for creative ontologies to write back to colonising 
assumptions in diverse and pluralising ways.  
II. Chakrabarty’s Anthropocenic Demand: Disjunctive and Impossible 
Chakrabarty has recently argued that postcolonial criticism, indeed, ‘all progressive 
political thought’ (2012:15), must come to terms with the profound change the scalar 
implication of the human as geological force invokes. He writes, ‘the challenges for the 
postcolonial scholar…come from two figures of the human simultaneously: the human-human 
and the nonhuman-human’ (2012:11). Specifically, this is ‘the challenge of having to think of 
human agency over multiple and incommensurable scales at once’ (2012:1). Anthropogenic 
climate change and generalized ecological destruction presents a ‘real problem’ (2012: 12) for 
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postcolonial studies, which, he claims, ‘need[s] to stretch to adjust itself to the reality of global 
warming’ (2012:1).  
The problem, Chakrabarty suggests, is that in attempting to think the human, 
progressive politics faces a disjunctive incommensurability (2012:2). On the one hand, as a 
form of critical, deconstructive politics, postcolonial analysis is very good at analyzing and 
critiquing the terms of colonialism and globalisation. It is very good at debunking claims about 
how the world of modernity is supposedly indubitably registered and rendered. The 
supposition of, for instance, globalization as homogeneity is instead questioned by raising the 
necessary and ideologically occluded features of ‘anthropological difference’ that make up the 
innumerable experiences of being human. On the other hand, this same critical perspective is 
today charged, as never before, with the need to account for the human as a collective, 
anthropogenic agent whose force is Anthropocenic, i.e. geological. This, he says, creates a 
disjunctive problem for thinking the human. Chakrabarty writes, 
These views of the human do not supersede one another. One cannot put them 
along a continuum of progress. No one view is rendered invalid by the presence of 
the others. They are simply disjunctive. Any effort to contemplate the human 
condition todayafter colonialism, globalization, and global warmingon political 
and ethical registers encounters the necessity of thinking disjunctively about the 
human, through moves that in their simultaneity appear contradictory (2012:2). 
 
He continues to what he sees as the nub of the problem for contemporary postcolonial 
attempts to think the human: we are required at once to think difference and totality. ‘The 
science of anthropogenic global warming has doubled the figure of the humanyou have to 
think of the two figures of the human simultaneously: the human-human and the non-human-
human. And that is where some challenges lie for the postcolonial scholar’ (2012: 11). 
 In setting up a response to this perceived problem, though, he precludes the very 
conditions necessary for thinking the human otherwise. These limitations take two forms. First, 
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he argues that ‘our thinking about ourselves now stretches our capacity for interpretive 
understanding’ (2012:13). This claim betrays a fundamental division for Chakrabarty between 
word and world. Interpretation must stretch to accommodate itself to a world to which it also 
must, even in a weak sense, be adequate or truthful. Critique is required, under this 
framework (as indeed under the ostensibly materialist frameworks proposed by Lazarus) to 
attune itself to revealing and mobilising a privileged position on a world beyond appearances. 
This figuration would be able to mediate, in light of its ostensibly privileged access, claims 
between difference, and, at the same time, the demands of a human generalisability. 
Chakrabarty thus appeals for ‘non-ontological ways of thinking the human’ (2012: 13) to bring 
about this needed interpretive stretching. Stretching is an epistemological, aesthetic, or 
political exercise, but it is one that reinforces phenomenal human agencies and accounts over 
the non-human. 
In doing so, he critiques Latour’s ontological appeal to an active political partnership of 
human and non-human agencies. Chakrabarty suggests in response to Latour that ‘geo-
physical force’, such as planetary changes driven by an Anthropocenic agent, ‘…is neither 
subject nor an object, but…is pure, non-ontological agency’ (2012: 13, emphases added), and 
therefore is problematical for Latour’s account. Such a claim perhaps reveals a fundamental 
misunderstanding of Latour’s position, and related contemporary postconstructivist appeals to 
immanence, political ontology, and new materialist turns to more-than-human agencies. 
Force, movement, dynamism, etc., are precisely the ontological real invoked by relationalist 
and post-humanist approaches. That’s all there is for many postconstuctivist positions: 
process, dynamism, plasticity, force, change, and movement (see for ex. Hawkins, 2010; 
Jackson, 2012; Massumi, 2002; Protevi, 2011). As Michael Halewood writes, ‘it is the ongoing 
and eventful process of existence that is social, and it is within this that the subjects and 
objects of nature come to be (and are passed beyond)’ (2005: 60). Process first, then the 
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immanent abstractions of subject and object, nature and culture, self and other. Objects are 
simply scalar experiences of different topological processes and events. Subjects and objects 
are topological facets of how we emerge from and look at an immanent, processual world. 
‘Properties of materials are not fixed attributes of matter, but are processual and relational’ 
(Ingold, 2007: 1), or, as fellow anthropologist in postconstructivism, Viveiros de Castro, writes, 
‘there is no stuff at the heart of matter, just form, that is, relation (2012: 153). 
In Chakrabarty’s subject-object framing, the environment and matter is revealed as 
static, a passive substrate that needs to be exercised upon by a progressive, critical human will 
that needs to stretch itself to a demand always beyond it. Instead of developing a nuanced, 
relational account of human responsibility to a planetary ground that is always already 
imbricated in the material and mental constitution of the human, Chakrabarty re-invokes the 
very colonial metaphysics he attempts to question. Therein, he also ‘waives the opportunity 
“to conceptualize the dynamics of the socio-ecological totality as a global system, as an 
immense bundle of human and extra human relations and processes organized through the 
mode of production”’(Niblett as quoted in Parry, 2012:346-7). For, it is precisely the capacity of 
systemic, imbricated understanding that we need to develop if we are to address the totality 
of relations that constitute the human in our postcolonial present.  
To return, then, to the constitutive disjunction with which Chakrabarty’s argument 
began, there is a disjunction that contemporary politics must face only because, for him, the 
terms of the argument seem incapable of invoking an ontological worldview other than that 
bequeathed by a bifurcationist epistemology, wherein word and world are fundamentally 
dissociative. Yet, this is also the root we need to address if we are to re-think the human for 
our present. It is not the case that we must necessary think disjunctively about the politics of 
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the human. There are more choices about ways to think becoming, but they require ‘imagining 
new imperatives that structure all of us as planetary human beings’ (Spivak, 2012: 350).  
The next section turns to Spivak’s attempt to figure such new imperatives. It argues 
that although she presents a more nuanced account, and one that hints at material 
immanence, it too falls short of imagining radical imperatives due to its privileging of critical 
aporia.  
II.ii Spivak: Impossible Planetarity 
Spivak’s argument has, for over a decade, gone some way to address the problematic 
Chakrabarty heralds for postcolonial studies. Unlike Chakrabarty, as noted, she sees 
‘planetarity’, as she terms it, as ‘the catachresis for inscribing collective responsibility’ 
(2003:102). The attempt is to construct an alternative epistemic figuring of radical alterity to 
that of postcolonial studies, which limits itself to the problems of globalization, nationalism, 
and the proliferating colonial logics associated with metropolitan grids of capital exchange. 
Planetarity seeks to shift the episteme by reversing and displacing the global into the planetary 
(2003: 73). She writes: 
The Earth is a paranational image that can substitute for international and can 
perhaps provide, today, a displaced site for the imagination of planetarity… 
Consequently, … ‘postcolonial studies,’ will not suffice to name and contain an 
adequate analytic response to contemporary globalized capitalism (2003:95). 
‘An ethical experience of the impossible other’, planetarity, Spivak argues, is needed to ground 
our ethical constitution towards an other, an ethico-epistemic orientation integral to what it 
means to be human (2003: 73). Planetarity, then, acts as an aporetic ethics. It opens us to an 
underived (i.e. non-human) embrace, and asks us to think ourselves subjects rather than global 
agents. Unlike the Anthropocenic worry that runs through Chakrabarty’s recent work, the 
human is figured by the planet into a subject position that manifests a certain temporal 
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humility and tenuity, which itself is subjectified by the presence of an arche-fossil. Arche-fossil 
simply means ‘a material indicating traces of ‘ancestral’ phenomena anterior even to the 
emergence of life’ (Meillassoux, 2008:3). The figure of the planet is this trace for Spivak. For, 
‘to think ourselves as planetary is to remember that if we live a hundred years, even a 
devastated planet lives a billion, without us’ (Spivak, 2008: 247). So, while the planet figures a 
ground before and after human life through which we must learn to represent ourselves, the 
basis of this ground remains impossible to decipher. Planetarity, as the geographer Joel 
Wainwright interprets Spivak, ‘reflects our being responsible to our being incapable of 
reflecting ourselves’ (2012: 70). Critique, then, is the aesthetic and epistemic exercise of 
perpetual self-examination and reflexion in the face of (im)possible non-human otherness.  
The job of approaching the task of reflecting ourselves, however impossibly, falls, for 
Spivak, to aesthetics, specifically teleopoesis. Spivak draws explicitly from Derrida’s Politics of 
Friendship to argue that teleopoesis rather than istoria is required to address the problem of 
impossible planetarity (2003: 97). Revealing for the present analysis, however, is the fact that 
teleopoesis is the imaginative act that remains undecided in its fundamental separation from 
the human. It is, she writes,  
Imaginative making at a distance – teleopoesis…Thus when the bondsman 
affects and reverse-performs the lord by claiming ancestry, that is teleopoesis. … 
This imaginative grafting is in the name of a new kind of ‘perhaps’, the 
possibilization of [an] impossible possible [which] must remain at one and the 
same time as undecideable – and therefore as decisive – as the future itself. … 
We cannot decide it and therefore it remains decisive’ (2000: 19). 
The bondsman planet here usurps the supposed global master to evidence an arche-fossil 
trace as ancestry, and hence ‘perhaps’ imperative. Yet, the planet remains an aporetic in its 
imaginative grafting; it remains fundamentally other than the human, and across a divide that 
can only ever fall short, but which must be faced as if it could be overcome. These are end of 
the road geographies; interesting, attractive, productive, powerful even, but ultimately also 
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the reason the progressive politics of postcolonialism is questioning its future under the 
auspices of textual poststructuralism and agonal politics. 
II.iii Spivak: Impossible Redux? 
At least, this, so far, has been the picture presented in work predating the 2012 
publication of An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization. A subtle shift has taken place 
in Spivak’s work, one which, though it does not signal a turn away from previous arguments, it 
also evidences a slight unease with the aporetic constitution that, try as it might, argues we 
cannot bridge the word and world gap, but must always return to in an inevitable interstices. 
Two observations bear this shift out. The first is an almost imperceptibly small change in 
language, a slippage even, between two characterizations of planetary belonging. The second 
is less subtle and reveals a curious turn to systems thinking and complexity theory through 
Gregory Bateson to argue for an aesthetic disruption of the habits that reinforce the 
proliferation of colonial logics. 
First. In the 1999 and 2003 essays that explore planetarity proper, Spivak writes that 
planetarity refers to that ecological, arche-fossil other through which we can challenge the 
colonial masteries of the global. ‘The globe is on our computers. No-one lives there. It allows 
us to think that we can aim to control it. The planet is in the species of alterity, belonging to 
another system; and yet we inhabit it, on loan’ (2003: 72, emphasis added). Now, one might 
first think in response, ‘No it isn’t!’ The planet’s not another system to us. We’re not inhabiting 
it on loan. Humans haven’t arrived from outside the planet, taken up residence, and 
negotiated with it as visiting alien life. We are of it, emergent from it. Planetarity is us. Spivak’s 
characterization of our planetary relationship is a strange one, but not foreign to an 
epsitemology which emerges from a commitment to aporia and Kantian critique.  
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Spivak, though, is not consistent in this epistemic characterization. In the more recent 
publication of a similar essay in her 2012 volume, she presages our reasonable appeal. This 
very small shift signals something larger. She writes in the most recent version of the text: ‘The 
globe is on our computers. It is the logo of the World Bank. No one lives there; and we think 
that we can aim to control globality. The planet is in the species of alterity, belonging to 
another system; and yet we inhabit it, indeed are it’ (2012: 338, emphasis added); two almost 
identical sentences are presented, one invoking material loan, the other invoking, very 
differently, ontological identity in ‘another system’. ‘We are planetarity’ in alterity. What can 
we make of this inconsistency? 
Clues reside in the ‘Introduction’ to An Aesthetic Education where more substantial 
evidence bears out a tentative attempt to figure a relationship of planetary embodiment. In 
this essay, Spivak appeals for aesthetic education to ‘short-circuit the unreflective and 
embodied habits’ that limit examining the conditions for the possibility of our perilous 
contemporaneity (Spivak, 2012: 6). The planetary work of re-arranging desires, she argues, lies 
in an aesthetic training, whereby ‘the habit of the ethical can only be worked at through 
attending to the systemic task of epistemological engagement’ (2012:9). Two kinds of habit are 
set against one another. The first are the habits of globalization that ‘oblige us to 
transcendentalize religion and nation’ (2012: 10). The second are new imaginary habits whose 
remit is to ‘keep up the work of displacing belief onto the terrain of the imagination, attempt 
to access the epistemic’ (2012:10). Habit as a kind of embodied unthinking hegemony emerges 
as a significant trope for Spivak due to her turn to Gregory Bateson and Gramsci. Bateson 
provides her with a model of characterizing how colonial and capitalist logics embody 
themselves in and through unreflective human subjects. She quotes Bateson. 
‘[H]abits are comparatively “hard programmed”…The economy consists 
precisely in not re-examining or re-discovering the premises of habit every time 
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the habit is used. We may say that these habits are partly “unconscious”, orif 
you pleasea habit of not examining them is developed’ (Bateson, as quoted in 
Spivak, 2012: 6). 
Gramsci provides a model for addressing how new imaginary and intellectual habits need to 
become equally embodied but as ‘active participants in practical life’ (2012: 10). Aesthetic 
education between habit and praxis then are the means to teach ‘the humanities in such a way 
that all subjects are “contaminated”’(2012:9), and, therein a way to overcoming globalized 
habitual embodiment or ‘contamination’ with new forms of life, new forms of habit, and news 
forms of critical contamination. 
Spivak’s language strains to capture ontological hybridity; at the same time, it seeks to 
preserve the (in)decisive aporetic tensions which render the planetary (un)thinkable. By 
insisting on aporetic planetarity as “ground”, Spivak reinforces a classic nature/culture 
distinction. Earth becomes the other against which culture tests its representational capacities, 
knowing that, in the ethical reflexions required of critique, they will always prove impossible to 
the task. Culture, and especially for the critic, an educated, aesthetic praxis, is the domain of 
reflexivity; nature, the thing always outside and beyond, but under conditions of planetarity, is 
the face, the call, of the non-human other. But its call is never heard.  
Spivak’s own epistemic habit of clinging to aporetic grounds for ethics and politics 
precludes those capacities by which the planet may be seen and heard and smelled and felt 
and tasted and thought to speak. It can’t speak because the cultural subject, the aesthetic 
educator, is figured as the critical, aesthetic, and cultured speaking thing, through which the 
impossible planet does not speak. Earth, though present and subjectifying is mute. And, no 
amount of critical reflexivity will let it speak. In an early essay on the limits of reflexivity, Latour 
notes that reflexivity is a sort of aporia from which reflexivists “cannot escape except by 
indefinite navel gazing, dangerous solipsism, insanity, and probably death” (1988:155). 
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Hyperbolic as this may be, he continues when pressed later in an interview about such a 
comment, to explain that aporetic reflexivity is ‘…superficial; it does not give the nonhumans 
action, it only defines the rhetoric of humans about non-humans’ (Latour, 1993:116). Spivak’s 
position is surely this. If she wants to listen to the always already speaking more-than-human, 
then the aporia must be dissolved in a collapse of the nature-culture distinction that lies at the 
heart of her often powerfully reflexive, but ultimately bifurcationist, critique. 
Ironically, the theorist she invokes to habitualize new aesthetic pedagogies, Gregory 
Bateson, did seek in his systems theory to collapse the divide between nature and culture, 
epistemology and ontology. Bateson’s notion of the three ecologies – environment, mind, and 
society – later taken up in different ways by Felix Guattari, attempts to narrate an imbricated 
figure of consubstantial and processual entanglement. Based in a systems theory of feedback 
and balance, the three ecologies together constitute a complex planetary whole with each 
system interdependent and co-constituting. The habits of mind Spivak invokes from Bateson 
were habits of embodied interaction of the whole, which is why Bateson was keen to puncture 
the epistemic pathologies which grounded them, and from which they and resisting habits 
emerged. It is thus something of a performative contradiction on the part of Spivak to write 
that on the one hand ‘we are planetarity’, and on the other, to preclude culture as the same 
thing as nature in the aporetic privilege. Bateson was a monist who saw mind (mind qua 
information process) and nature as a necessary unity; nature for Bateson simply is one vast 
interconnected, dynamic, open-ended cybernetic system, or what he calls mind (Bateson, 
2002). Habit is simply a way of capturing, not unlike Bateson’s early 19th century predecessor, 
Felix Ravaisson, a material and affective continuity between mind and body, will and nature 
(see, Carlisle, 2010; Dewsbury, 2012; Ravaisson, 2008). As Bateson uses the term, habit 
collapses the nature-culture distinction into an episto-ontology. Spivak’s argument intimates in 
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this direction but pulls back to the aesthetic to fall short of invoking new imaginaries for 
planetary embodiment. 
Impossibility and incommensurability. Both Spivak and Chakrabarty figure the planet 
as impossible, vexing, alternative other to postcolonial studies. However, in both cases, the 
radical potential of postcolonial studies to stretch itself to new ontological demands is, I argue, 
thwarted by postcolonialism’s own habit of too often seeing its discursive limits in the ever 
more reflexive, de-naturalization of politics through ever more refined forms of critique. On 
the one hand, Chakrabarty misunderstands the terms, and thus the potential, of a political 
ontology, and re-introduces a colonial bifurcation of mind and nature. And, on the other, while 
Spivak articulates a more nuanced and complex aesthetic position, in calling for a systematic 
epistemic critique attentive to an aporetic ground of the ‘perhaps’, her own approach, alive to 
the linguistic and cultural turns she was so influential in bringing about, cleaves again to its 
habitual privileging of representational epistemologies which impossibly, decisively, fall short 
of the Earth.  
 So, what are we to do? Where to for postcolonial geographies of the present? In the 
next section, the paper turns briefly to approaches within and without geography that are 
seeking to articulate new imaginaries for planetary human being. Unlike the human impossibly 
figured as materially other than earth, these positions build beyond the aporetic to compose 
immanent accounts of material becoming, but accounts that are also alive to the potentialities 
and politics of proliferating different agencies and therefore imaginaries of alternative 
presents and futures. 
III.i Postconstructivism and Political Ontology: Postcolonial Geographies 
 What’s both interesting and problematic with Spivak’s account traced above is the 
fact that, in her turn to embodied habit and a re-arranged systematic epistemology of desires, 
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the argument for aesthetic education as epistemic short-circuit attempts to engage the 
discursive and non-discursive aspects of human political enactment. The argument 
characterizes, but does not commit to also ways of enacting multiple political embodiments for 
the present. These embodiments try to be two things at once. They try to ‘think the human…as 
having both ontological and non-ontological modes of existence’ (Chakrabarty, 2012:14). But is 
this even possible? 
 ‘Post-constructivist’ approaches would, I think, answer in the negative. But not 
because worries about ideas and knowledge are somehow illegitimate, but because the 
habitual modern premise that transcendentalizes the subject/object and word and world 
binaries reaffirms the binary rather than undoing it entirely. ‘Political ontology’ is a way around 
this conundrum. ‘Political ontology’, following Mario Blaser’s definition, refers both to the 
politics that shape particular worlds, and the material, and hence social, conflicts that ensue as 
different worlds interact, mingle, and sustain one another (2009: 877). What is distinctive 
about an approach that seeks to articulate political immanence is the recognition that 
ontologies are not epistemic or aesthetic reflexions that precede the constitution of ordinary 
and abstract practices. Rather they are shaped through the practices, processes, and material 
interactions that are existence, that are word and world (see, for instance, Latour, 1999). 
Ontologies perform themselves as worlds (Blaser, 2009: 877).  
 Given the performative contradictions in advancing postcolonial and progressive 
politics outlined above, we might have, with political ontology, an answer to what is missing in 
the contemporary effort to decolonise knowledge production. If we want to decolonize 
knowledge, we must provincialise not simply the Eurocentric bias that continues to manifest 
itself in knowledge productionincluding very much my own here. We must challenge not 
simply a univocal modernity with multiple modernities (for instance, Chatterjee, 2010; 
Grossberg, 2010), for this, as and Blaser (2009) reminds us, leaves the matrix of modernization 
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and the implicit privileging of Euro-modernity intact. We must go further than even the term 
‘provincialise’ allows, tied as it is to the modernist and postcolonial habit of the metropolitan 
subject or nation state. We need to radicalise the provincialising call to recognize that 
underneath it is the still more fundamental euro-modernist privilege of nature and culture, 
subject and object, self and other. More silent still, the modern privilege subtends even the 
euro-centric geography. “Euro-modernity remains a powerful (and perhaps inescapable) 
“gravitational force” impinging on our diagnostics of the present conjuncture, and therefore of 
the potential futures we imagine’ (Blaser, 2009: 880). To counterbalance this force, we need 
non-modern postcolonial geographies. Not just ‘pre-capitalist’ as Spivak has referred to them 
(2003: 101); the ‘pre-‘ signifies here simply the gravitational pull of Euro-modernity. There is 
room for a realist postcolonial geography of the of a post-constructivist sort. Composing one, 
or rather, one amongst many will help us to enact fundamental realities, realities not 
commensurable under the conceptual habits that modern ontologies allow, but which exist as 
relational assemblages, wherein the bifurcation of cultural ontology qua culture, and natural 
ontology qua nature are not hierarchically related nor fundamentally and impossibly opposed.  
 Critical approaches like those described above leave the Nature/Culture distinction 
and its supporting subject/object, self and other binaries largely alone: Chakrabarty with his 
disjunctive problematic for figuring the human against a static other, worries about preserving 
subjects and object; Spivak, more nuanced, but with her aesthetic teleopoesis, clings to an 
aporetic ethics of impossible planetary figuring and so reinforces a nature-culture distinction. 
The consequence is that they translate the postcolonial problematic of difference against a 
background of Euro-modern culture. Ontological difference is converted into a problematic of 
letting other critical and cultural perspectives be heard, but heard against an assumed 
background of Nature (see also Blaser, 2009: 888-89). The problem then becomes one of 
hearing non-modern worlds, and thus ontologies, that do not assume a fundamental 
20 
 
bifurcation of nature and culture. Many, particularly aboriginal and indigenous ontologies are 
examples of this, and are far more relational than they are hierarchical. By foregoing the 
capacity to recognize their own immanent implication, these recent attempts to shift the tenor 
of postcolonial and progressive politics to a supposedly more radical footing actually repeat 
the modernist problematic they are attempting to overcome. They do not overcome the 
unquestioned assumption that nature and culture, word and world, noumena and phenomena 
remain a crucial fundament, and therefore constituent grammar, to their critique. 
 Several examples present themselves in evidencing approaches which foreground 
political ontologies of non-modern difference. Within the political ecology and anthropology 
literature, the more well known are the ethnographies of different Amazonian and Amerindian 
cultures by the French student of Levi-Strauss, Philippe Descola (1994; 1996; forthcoming) and 
the Brazilian anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (1992; 1998; 2010; 2012). Both 
Descola and Viveiros de Castro are becoming increasingly influential outside of anthropology, 
in part, thanks to the influence of people like Latour, Serres, and Tim Ingold who are similarly 
oriented to postconstructivist thinking, and are sympathetic interlocutors with their work. 
Informed by their ethnological studies of the Achuar in the Western Amazon, and the Araweté 
who live on the Xingu River in the north of the Amazon Basin, both authors argue from 
positions that do not take the back-grounded nature of Euro-modern binaries for granted. 
Indeed, they actively disrupt them.   
[N]ature is not something that exists everywhere and always; or to be more 
precise, that the radical separation so long established by the West between 
world of nature and the world of human beings does not have much meaning 
for other peoples who, for their part, confer the attributes of social life upon 
plants and animals,…and who could therefore not possibly expel them into an 
autonomous sphere upon which science and technology gradually come to 
impose their mathematical laws and control…In order for anyone to be close to 
nature, nature must exist; and it is only the moderns who have proved capable 
of conceiving its existence, a fact that probably renders our cosmology more 
enigmatic and less sympathetic than the cosmologies of all the cultures that 
have preceded us (Descola, 1996: 405-6). 
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Theirs is an analysis that reads cultural objectslanguage, stories, toolsas emergent hybrid 
processes within a non-cumulative, immanent, and un-oriented time. These ethnologists 
formulate a monistic anthropological, and especially on the part of Viveiros de Castro, a 
philosophical and political theory that attempts to move beyond nature and culture to argue 
that, 
the world is composed of qualities...that emerge via the interaction between the 
subjects that perceive and act upon the world, and the specific physical 
properties of the world itself. This isn’t a representation or a construction. It’s an 
actualization of properties...’(Descola, 2009: 142, emphasis in original).  
 
 ‘Perspectival multinaturalism’, the term given to their approach, (Viveiros de Castro, 
2004) is, loosely, the attempt to characterize the fact that, whereas a Euro-modern ontology 
perceives culture differentiating itself through time against a background of primal nature, 
Amerindians conceive ‘culture or the subject [as] the form of the universal, while nature or the 
object is the form of the particular’…‘One culture, multiple naturesone epistemology, 
multiple ontologies. Perspectivism implies multinaturalism, for a perspective is not a 
representation. … The body is the origin of perspectives’ (2004: 466, 474-5). Theirs is a theory 
that attempts to come to terms with multiple natures that differentiate from a cosmologically 
primary culture, and the embodied differences of form afford the perspectives that actualise 
knowledge claims. Multi-natures ‘embodied as assemblages of affects or ways of being that 
constitute habitus’ perform and therein materialise, particular worldly becomings as 
compositional perspectives (2004: 475). Hence, ‘for Amazonian peoples, the original common 
condition of both humans and animals is not animality but, rather, humanity’ (2004: 465). This 
extends also to the non-human.  
Human and non-human persons have an integrally “cultural” view of their life 
sphere because they share the same kind of interiority, but the world that all 
these entities apprehend and use is different, for each employs distinct bodily 
equipment (Descola, 2006: 141).  
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 What is important about this observation for the present argument is not whether it 
is true or not that animals share in different ways a human ‘cosmology’, but that the premises 
from which the claim is made is one that begins from a multi-faceted relational account of 
embodied becoming, and not from an assertion that nature is fundamentally other that 
culture. For as Descola and Viveiros de Castro are keen to point out, conceptions of nature 
within the Western Euro-centric tradition have themselves constitutive genealogies (Blaser, 
2009: 886-87). This point is, of course, not unfamiliar to poststructuralist accounts of 
knowledge, but the ontological implications of performatively suspending the binary are taken 
seriously by these ethnological ontologies. For example, Viveiros de Castro characterizes the 
Kantian problematic that plagues Spivak’s aporetic politics nicely, although for a different 
context. In doing so, he highlights the underlying reticence to immanence that precludes for 
planetarity the radical politics it supposes for itself.  
Our constructionist epistemology can be summed up in the Saussurean (and 
very Kantian) formula, “the point of view creates the object.” The subject, in 
other words, is the original, fixed condition whence the point of view emanates 
(the subject creates the point of view). Whereas Amerindian perspectival 
ontology proceeds as though the point of view creates the subject: whatever is 
activated or agented by the point of view will be the subject’ (2004: 467, 
emphasis in original). 
 Multi-natural perspectivism and political ontology lie at the heart another, and quite 
separate, example pertaining to Amerindian ethnology, one that does not invoke, nor even 
reference Descola and Viveiros de Castro. This example is almost purely contained to the 
domain of linguistic anthropology and debates around grammar and culture. The controversial 
Amazonian and Amerindian linguist, Daniel Everett, has gained renown of late due to his 
anthropological and linguistic challenges to theories of universal grammar that continue to 
dominate contemporary linguistics (2005; 2012).  
 Everett, who has studied the language and culture of the Pirahã, a small group of 
isolated people living in the north western Amazon, argues that language is a product of 
culture, and a tool that emerges from the ontological and embodied contexts of peoples’ lives. 
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This theory flies in the face of an almost universally accepted theory of human grammar, first 
put forward by the eminent linguist Noam Chomsky, regarding the innate cognitive structures 
of language bearing subjects. Chomsky’s theory is often used to distinguish between the 
complexities of language and society bearing subjects (humans), and those without language 
and society (non-humans). Everett’s ethnographic and linguistic studies of the Pirahã reveal 
that, unusually, the language of this group of people does not fulfil the criteria ascribed by the 
universal grammar hypothesis for abstract thought and human complexity. But, on 
observation, they do have abstract thought and are deeply complex human beings, but simply 
manifest this complexity in different ontological ways. For example, their language does not 
use unique colour terms; numbers beyond a few; nor geographical directional terms; nor do 
they have detailed recourse to mythological stories or a sense of deep past or future. Most 
importantly, the linguistic debate has centred on the existence or not of linguistic of recursion 
which is taken by innate grammars hyposthesis as a criteria for abstract thought, and hence a 
claim about humanness. While it is beyond the scope of the present argument to analyze in 
detail the debate, what is important to note, is that, although unanalysed in the terms Descola 
and Viveiros de Castro frame them, Everett argues that language and thinking is a materialized 
function of embodied affordance. Our languages emerge as immanent and embodied tools, 
that is performative, creative enactments rather than representational simulacra, from the 
general ecology of relations that unfold as our lifeworlds.  
[I]f culture can constrain grammar, then grammar is not prespecified in some 
instinct or language acquisition device [i.e. unyielding static nature], but instead 
is part of a communication system shaped by external forces, including 
information structure, the oral-aural channel, and culture (Everett, 2012: 288). 
 
He uses the example of directional words to explain. 
  
There are many groups in the world who, like the Pirahãs, do not use their 
bodies to orient themselves dirtectionally, but, rather, use the world outside 
their body for this purpose. The Pirahãs would never say ‘turn left’ or ‘turn right’ 
but ‘turn up river’ or ‘turn towards the jungle’ or ‘turn down river,’ and so 
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on….Pirahãs do not, and cannot, tell someone to turn left; instead they use 
external geography (2012: 265-66). 
 
What Everett is describing is a hybrid ontology of embodiment, wherein the linguistic, 
semiotic, and abstract capacities of culture and grammar are a function of an ontological 
agency distributed through an ecology of relations specific to the Pirahã. It is an account 
of knowledge formation wherein, quite unselfconsciously for Everett, the simple 
recognition of ontological rather than epistemic difference emerges from accepting the 
nature-culture collapse. It is a recognition that has profound implications for how we 
seek to know the world otherwise, not in the terms of Euro-modern or Eurocentric 
privilege, but in the terms of the different subjects themselves. 
 Indeed, Everett’s account of linguistic ecological affordance is not unique. The 
anthropologist and feminist theorist, Vicky Kirby, has recently re-examined Derrida’s 
textualism to argue much the same. 
[W]e do not need to circumscribe the arena of production and reproduction by 
segregating what is properly cultural from what is then, and inevitably, deemed 
alien, primordial, and inarticulate. What I propose is not a simple reitieration of 
the sort of cultural constructionist arguments that remind us that what appears 
as Nature is better understood as the dissembling of Culture…Instead I 
suggest…why the strange condensations that confuse and collapse differences 
into the mirror-maze of an always already might better be described as facts of 
Nature (2011: 92-3).     
  
If also somewhat less multi-naturalist than other of her colleagues, Descola and Viveiros de 
Castro in particular, Kirby does place firmly at the feet of moving past a textualist, 
constructivist, and poststructuralist questioning of the human, an immanent ontology of 
becoming.  
[A]nthropomorphism’s infinite differentiations/specificities are expressions of one 
phenomenon, one implicated spacetimemattering. How we approach this 
phenomenon (which includes us), a phenomenon whose identifications entail constant 
morphogenesis, is to open the question of the human, and writing, as if for the first 
time (2011: 21). 
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How very different, radical, and indeed, perhaps even hopeful, for composing new conceptions 
of human being this call is, compared to the incommensurable disjunction facing Chakrabarty 
or the impossible imperative facing Spivak.  
Indigenous questions, that is, questions of natural belonging and ‘being-with’ life 
emergent is the new question for ‘progressive compositions of a common world’ (Latour, 
2004: 53); this includes progressive postcolonialisms, theoretical, geographical, and otherwise. 
Far from being the end of postcolonial theory (Agnani et al., 2007), it might actually mean the 
end of one kind, and a new beginning for a much older, more radical form. This is not at all to 
negate the many excellent indigenous scholarships already with significant influence (see for 
instance, Alfred, 2011; Alfred and Corntassel, 2005; Byrd, 2011; Larsen, 2006). It is to extend 
them by suggesting that, for postcolonialism, the crucial question of rethinking the human 
through attending to natural belonging needs to analyse itself in light of ontological 
commitments to material difference and hybridity that emerge from careful, creative, and 
decisive attention to the sensible.   
IV. Conclusion  
If ‘indigeneity still troubles postcolonial theory’ (Stam and Shohat, 2012: 384), it does 
so for the all the right reasons. Less worried to denaturalise problems of originsalthough this 
is still a crucial component to critiquequestions today are composed by postconstructivist 
approaches to indigeneity in the attempt to invoke conceptual means both ancient and, at the 
same time, radically new. Ancient and new: a simple definition of immanence. The questions 
being asked and the specific answers being composed are tackling tropes and habits of a 
constructivist postcolonial discourse running short on new ideas, if also unfortunately, not 
running short on proliferating colonial and imperial legacies against which to direct those 
ideas.  
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Ten years ago the challenge facing postcolonial geographies was laid down in the call 
to dislocate knowledge production away from a Eurocentric referent to provincialised locales. 
It was manifestly successful in many respects. The fact that we are still asking the question 
about the extent of its re-writing indicates something of delimiting horizons. Today, 
postcolonial studies, postcolonial theory, and postcolonial geographies are facing a different 
demand. It is one, in fact, which might not have been visible had the earlier provincialising call 
not been heard and tried. But, much has happened between then and now. Climate change is 
an undisputed Real that we can see and feel. Witness Australia’s need for new temperature 
colours in its weather forecasts. New wars have opened up, and are in the process of closing 
down, unresolved, only to open up again on different fronts, and by many of the same colonial 
and resistant actors. Witness Mali and France, Afghanistan and the UK. Neo-liberal processes 
are re-consolidating and deepening in the face of new enclosures and new crises. Witness 
Greece and Spain. Witness new dams in the Amazon, or payments against oil extraction in 
Ecuador and Peru to save rainforests and peoples, or Chinese special economic zones in 
Southern Africa. Resource colonialisms continue unabated despite decades of promises 
otherwise. Witness Canada’s First Nations hunger strikes and ‘Idle No More’. The new 
demands are ones that ask us to reach deeper than provincialising allows to address our 
implicate becoming within an ever hybridizing pluriverse.  
The form these take is as open as the question. Hopefully they will take a form quite 
different from the one presented here, theoretical and disciplinary rather than world focused 
as it is. Composing new postcolonial geographies attentive to the question of natural belonging 
and the radical immanence of human thought and becoming through dispersed relational 
ecologies should be an imaginative and creative exercise, as open to different ways of writing, 
thinking, representing, and doing as there are modes of becoming. One can’t say what these 
should look like, as they will be as diverse as the composers in their composing. What becomes 
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important for a postcolonial geography here is the emphasis placed not on progressing or 
advancing critique. Composing and creation as critique, or rather composition as a particular 
re-use of critiquewhat Sharp calls a ‘re-naturalization of the politics of critique’ (2012)is 
suggested as the way forward. After all, I’m arguing that we need to re-naturalize approaches 
to an immanent postcolonial politics rather than as Lazarus argues, seek alternatives and 
supersession ‘only on the basis of a transcendental critique’ (2011: 35). 
To be sure, attending to natural belongingi.e. indigeneityand how we compose and 
therein understand material becoming might open conditions to previously unthought 
possibilities immanent within our pluriverse. If today’s concerns for postcolonial geographies 
are matters of concern for the commons, emerging social movements, biodiversity, material 
property rights, resource depletion, migration, cultural erasure, energy scarcity, equality, and 
the destructive imperatives of growth, then attending to them in radical ways, as indigenous 
and non-moderns have been composing for millennia, surely is one of our more important 
tasks for learning about, and so advancing, postcolonial geographies. 
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